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Abstract
Studying models of cyber epidemics over arbitrary complex networks can deepen our understanding of cyber
security from a whole-system perspective. In this paper, we initiate the investigation of cyber epidemic models that
accommodate the dependences between the cyber attack events. Due to the notorious difficulty in dealing with such
dependences, essentially all existing cyber epidemic models have assumed them away. Specifically, we introduce
the idea of Copulas into cyber epidemic models for accommodating the dependences between the cyber attack
events. We investigate the epidemic equilibrium thresholds as well as the bounds for both equilibrium and non-
equilibrium infection probabilities. We further characterize the side-effects of assuming away the due dependences
between the cyber attack events, by showing that the results thereof are unnecessarily restrictive or even incorrect.
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1 Introduction
Cyberspace (or Internet) is perhaps the most complex man-made system. While cyberspace has become an indispens-
able part of the society, economy and national security, cyber attacks also have become an increasingly devastating
problem. Despite studies and progresses in the past decades, our understanding of cyber security from a whole-system
perspective, rather than from a component or building-block perspective, is still at its infant stage. This is caused by
many factors, including the dearth of powerful mathematical models that can capture and reason the interactions
between the cyber attacks and the cyber defenses.
Recently, researchers have started pursuing the cyber-security value of “biological epidemics”-like mathematical
models. While conceptually attractive, biological epidemic models cannot be directly used to describe cyber security
because there are many cyber-specific issues. One particular issue, which we initiate its study in the present paper, is
the dependences between the cyber attack events. To the best of our knowledge, these dependences have been explic-
itly assumed away in essentially all existing cyber epidemic models, perhaps because they are notoriously difficult to
cope with. Indeed, accommodating the dependences introduces yet another dimension of difficulty to cyber epidemic
models that incorporate arbitrary complex network structures. However, the dependences are inherent because, for
example, the events that computers get infected are not independent of each other, and a malware may first infect
some computers because the users visit some malicious websites and then spread over the network. Moreover, cyber
attacks may be well coordinated by intelligent malwares, and the coordination causes positive dependences between
the attack events.
1.1 Our contributions
In this paper, we initiate the systematic study of a new sub-field in cyber epidemic models, namely understanding
and characterizing the importance of the dependences between the attack events in cyber epidemic models that ac-
commodate arbitrary complex network structures. This is demonstrated through a non-trivial generalization of the
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powerful push- and pull-based cyber epidemic model that was recently investigated in [19]. Specifically, we capture
the dependences between the cyber attack events by incorporating the idea of Copulas into cyber epidemic models. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic study of cyber epidemic models that accommodate dependences,
rather than assuming them away. Specifically, we make two contributions.
First, we derive epidemic equilibrium thresholds, namely sufficient conditions under which the epidemic spread-
ing enters a non-negative equilibrium (the spreading never dies out when there are pull-based attacks, meaning that
only positive equilibrium is relevant under this circumstance). Some of the sufficient conditions are less restrictive but
require hard-to-obtain information (i.e., these conditions are theoretically more interesting), and the others are more
restrictive but require easy-to-obtain information (i.e., these conditions are practically more useful). We also derive
bounds for the equilibrium infection probabilities and discuss their tightness. The bounds are easy to obtain/compute,
and are useful especially when it is infeasible to obtain the equilibrium infection probabilities numerically (let alone
analytically). For example, the upper bounds can be treated as the worst-case scenarios when provisioning defense
resources. For Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) and power-law networks, we further propose to approximate the equilibrium infec-
tion probabilities by taking advantage of the bounds. The approximation results are smaller than the upper bounds
and would not underestimate the number of infected nodes, meaning that the approximation results can lead to more
cost-effective defense. We further present bounds for non-equilibrium infection probabilities, no matter whether the
spreading converges to equilibrium or not. All the results are obtained by explicitly accommodating the dependence
structures between the cyber attack events.
Second, we characterize the side-effects of assuming away the due dependences on the bounds for equilibrium
infection probabilities, on the epidemic equilibrium thresholds, and on the non-equilibrium infection probabilities. We
show that assuming away the due dependences can make the results thereof unnecessarily restrictive or even incorrect.
We further discuss the cyber security implications of the side-effects.
It is worth mentioning that as a first step towards ultimately tackling the dependence problem in cyber epidemic
models, the Copulas technique, which we use in the present paper, is appealing because of the following. On one hand,
it leads to tractable models, while capable of coping with high-dimensional dependence (i.e., dependence between a
large vector of random variables). On the other hand, there are families of copula structures that have been extensively
investigated in the literature of Applied Probability Theory and Risk Management, and various methods have been
developed for estimating the types and parameters of copula structures in practice. Of course, much research remains
to be done before we can answer questions such as: What approach is the most appropriate for accommodating
dependence in cyber epidemic models, under what circumstances?
1.2 Related work
Biological epidemic models can be traced back to McKendrick and Kermack [13, 10]. Such homogeneous biological
epidemic models were introduced to computer science for characterizing the spreading of computer viruses in [9].
Heterogeneous epidemic models, especially the ones that accommodate arbitrary network structures, were not studied
until recently [17, 6, 1]. These studies led to the full-fledged push- and pull-based cyber epidemic model [19],
which is the starting point of the present paper. To the best of our knowledge, all existing cyber epidemic models,
which aim to accommodate arbitrary network structures (including other recent studies such as [16, 11, 20] and the
references therein), assumed that the attacks are independent of each other. This is plausible because accommodating
arbitrary network structures in cyber epidemic models already make the resulting models difficult to analyze, and
accommodating dependences introduces, as we show in the present paper, another dimension of difficulty to the
models.
The only exception is due to our recent study [18], which is based on a different approach to modeling cyber epi-
demics [11]. The main contribution of [18] is to get rid of the exponential distribution assumptions for certain random
variables. Moreover, the model in [18] can only accommodate the specific Marshall-Olkin dependence structure be-
tween the attack events. In contrast, we here accommodate arbitrary dependence structures between the attack events,
while investigating the epidemic equilibrium thresholds, the equilibrium and non-equilibrium infection probabilities,
and the side-effects of assuming away the due dependences. Many of these issues are not studied in the context of [18]
because its focus is different. This explains why the present paper is the first systematic treatment of dependences in
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cyber epidemic models.
The dependence modeled in the present paper is static (i.e., time-invariant). This study inspired [5], which makes
a further step towards modeling dynamic dependence between cyber attacks, but using a different modeling approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review some facts about Copulas. In Section
3 we investigate the generalized cyber epidemic model that accommodates the dependences between the cyber attack
events. In Section 4 we characterize the side-effects as caused by assuming away the due dependences. In Section 5,
we conclude the paper with future research problems.
The following table summarizes the main notations used in the paper.
G = (V,E) the graph/network in which cyber epidemics occurs, where V is the node set and E is the edge set
deg(v) the degree of node v in graph G = (V,E), which can be represented by adjacency matrix A
Iv(t), Iv,j(t) the state of node v at time t: Iv(t) = 1 means infected and 0 means secure; Iv,j(t) is the state of the
jth neighbor of node v (1 means infected and 0 means secure), where 1 ≤ j ≤ deg(v)
iv(t) the probability that node v ∈ V is infected at time t
iv,j(t) the condition probability that at time t node v ∈ V is secure but the jth neighbor of node v is infected
i−v , i
+
v lower and upper bounds for the non-equilibrium infection probability limt→∞ iv(t), where the sys-
tem does not converge to any equilibrium
i∗v, i
∗
v,j the equilibrium infection probabilities that node v and its jth neighbor are infected, respectively
i∗−, i∗+v i
∗− is the lower bound for the equilibrium infection probability i∗v for every v, i∗+v is the upper bound
for the equilibrium infection probability i∗v of node v
i∗, i∗v i
∗ = (i∗1, . . . , i
∗
N ) where N = |V|, i∗v = (i∗v,1, . . . , i∗v,deg(v))
α the probability that a secure node v ∈ V is infected by pull-based cyber attacks at a time step
β the probability that an infected node v ∈ V becomes secure at a time step
γ the probability that an infected node u successfully attacks node v over (u, v) ∈ E at a time step
ρ(M) spectral radius of matrix M
Cv deg(v)-copula describing the dependence between the push-based cyber attacks against node v
C 2-copula describing the dependence between the pull-based attacks and the push-based attacks
against a node
δC the diagonal section of copula C, i.e., δC(u) = C(u, . . . , u)
2 Preliminaries
Copulas can model dependences by relating the individual marginal distributions to their multivariate joint distribu-
tion. In this paper we will use the n-copulas [8, 15]. Specifically, a function C : [0, 1]n 7→ [0, 1] is called n-copula
if:
• C(u1, . . . , un) is increasing in each component uz , z ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
• C(u1, . . . , uz−1, 0, uz+1, . . . , un) = 0 for all uj ∈ [0, 1], j = 1, . . . , n, j 6= z.
• C(1, . . . , 1, uz , 1, . . . , 1) = uz for all uz ∈ [0, 1], z = 1, . . . , n.
• C is n-increasing, i.e., for all (u1,1, . . . , u1,n) and (u2,1, . . . , u2,n) in [0, 1]n with u1,j ≤ u2,j and for all j =
1, . . . , n, it holds that
2∑
z1=1
. . .
2∑
zn=1
(−1)
∑n
j=1 zjC(uz1,1, . . . , uzn,n) ≥ 0.
Let R1, . . . , Rn be random variables with distribution functions F1, . . . , Fn, respectively. The joint distribution
function is F (r1, . . . , rn) = P (R1 ≤ r1, . . . , Rn ≤ rn). The well-known Sklar’s theorem states that there exists an
n-copula C such that F (r1, . . . , rn) = C (F1(r1), . . . , Fn(rn)) .
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There are many families of copulas [8, 15]. One example is the Gaussian copula with
C(u1, . . . , un) = Φ∑
(
Φ−1(u1), . . . ,Φ
−1(un)
)
,
where Φ−1 is the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and Φ∑ is the joint
cumulative distribution function of a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero and covariance matrix
equal to the correlation matrix
∑
. For simplicity, we assume that the correlation matrix has the form
∑
=

1 σ . . . σ
σ 1 σ σ
. . .
σ σ . . . 1
 ,
where σ measures the correlation between two random variables. Therefore, the Gaussian copula can be rewritten as
C(u1, . . . , un) = Φσ
(
Φ−1(u1), . . . ,Φ
−1(un)
)
.
Another example is the Archimedean family with
C(u1, . . . , un) = φ
−1 (φ(u1) + . . .+ φ(un)) ,
where function φ is called a generator of C and satisfies certain properties (see [14] for details). The Archimedean
family contains many well-known copula functions such as the Clayton and Frank copulas [15, 3]. The generator of
the Clayton copula is φθ(u) = u−θ − 1, and we have
C(u1, . . . , un) =
 n∑
j=1
u−θj − n+ 1
−1/θ , θ > 0.
The generator of the Frank copula is ψξ(u) = log
(
e−ξu−1
e−ξ−1
)
, and we have
C(u1, . . . , un) = −1
ξ
log
{
1 +
∏n
j=1(e
−ξuj − 1)
(e−ξ − 1)n−1
}
, ξ > 0.
For illustration purpose, we will use the Gaussian, Clayton and Frank copulas as examples.
In order to compare the effects of dependences, we need to compare the degrees of dependences. For this purpose,
we use the concordance order [15, 8]. Let C1 and C2 be two copulas, we say C1 is less than C2 in concordance order
if C1(u1, . . . , un) ≤ C2(u1, . . . , un) for all 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , n. In particular, Gaussian copulas and Clayton
copulas are increasing in σ and θ in concordance order, respectively.
The following lemmas will be used in the paper.
Lemma 1 ([15]) Let C be any n-copula, then
max

n∑
j=1
uj − n+ 1, 0
 ≤ C(u1, . . . , un) ≤ min{u1, . . . , un}.
Lemma 2 ([15]) Let C be an n-copula, then
|C(u1, . . . , un)− C(v1, . . . , vn)| ≤
n∑
j=1
|uj − vj|.
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3 Cyber Epidemic Model With Arbitrary Dependences
Now we present and investigate the cyber epidemic model that accommodates the dependences between the cyber
attack events. This is the first systematic treatment of dependences in cyber epidemic models.
3.1 The Model
As in [19], we consider an undirected finite network graph G = (V,E), where V = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of
N = |V| nodes (vertices) that can abstract computers (or software components at an appropriate resolution), and
E = {(u, v) : u, v ∈ V} is the set of edges. Note that G abstracts the network structure according to which the
push-based cyber attacks take place (e.g., malware spreading), where (u, v) ∈ E abstracts that node u can attack
node v. In both principle and practice, G can range from a complete graph (i.e., any u ∈ V can directly attack any
v ∈ V) to any specific graph structure (i.e., node u may not be able to attack node v directly because, for example, the
traffic from node u is filtered or u is blacklisted by v), which explains why we should pursue general results without
restricting the network/graph structures. Denote by A = (avu) the adjacency matrix of G, where avu = 1 if and only
if (u, v) ∈ E, and avu = 0 otherwise. Note that the problem setting naturally implies avv = 0. Denote by deg(v) the
degree of node v. In a discrete-time model, node v ∈ V is either secure (but vulnerable to attacks) or infected (and can
attack other nodes) at any time t = 0, 1, . . .. At each time step, an infected node v becomes secure with probability β,
which abstracts the defense power. The model accommodates two large classes of cyber attacks: a secure node v can
become infected because of (i) pull-based cyber attacks with probability α, which include drive-by-download attacks
(i.e., node v getting infected because its user visits a malicious website) and insider attacks (i.e., the user intentionally
runs a malware on node v), or (ii) push-based cyber attacks launched by v’s infected neighbor u over edge (u, v) ∈ E
with probability γ.
Our extension to the above model is to accommodate the dependences between the push-based attacks as well
as the dependences between the push-based attacks and the pull-based attacks. These attacks are not independent
because the events that the nodes get infected are not independent of each other, and because the push-based attacks
are not independent of the pull-based attacks (e.g., a malware could first infect some nodes via the pull-based cyber
attacks and then launch the push-based cyber attacks from the infected nodes). Moreover, the dependences between
the push-based attacks can model that intelligent malwares launch coordinated attacks against the secure nodes.
Specifically, let Iv(t) denote the state of node v at time t, where Iv(t) = 1 means v is infected and 0 means v is
secure. Let
(
Iv,1(t), . . . , Iv,deg(v)(t)
)
denote the state vector of node v’s neighbors at time t, where
Iv,j(t) =
{
1, the jth neighbor of node v is infected at time t,
0, otherwise.
Define iv(t) = P(Iv(t) = 1) and iv,j(t) = P(Iv,j(t) = 1|Iv(t) = 0) where j = 1, . . . ,deg(v).
Let Xv(t) = 1 denote the event that node v is infected at time t+ 1 because of the push-based cyber attacks, and
Xv(t) = 0 otherwise. Let Xv,j(t+ 1) = 1 denote the event that node v is infected at time t + 1 by its jth neighbor,
and Xv,j(t+1) = 0 otherwise. Note that P(Xv,j(t+1) = 1|Iv(t) = 0) = γ · iv,j(t). Since any dependence structure
between Xv,1(t+ 1), . . . ,Xv,deg(v)(t+ 1) always can be accommodated by some copula function Cv, we have
P(Xv(t+ 1) = 0|Iv(t) = 0)
= Cv
(
1− P(Xv,1(t+ 1) = 1|Iv(t) = 0), . . . , 1− P(Xv,deg(v)(t+ 1) = 1|Iv(t) = 0)
)
= Cv
(
1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)
)
. (1)
Similarly, let Yv(t + 1) = 1 denote the event that node v is infected at time t + 1 because of the pull-based cyber
attacks. Then, we have P(Yv(t + 1) = 1|Iv(t) = 0) = α. By further accommodating the dependence structure
between the push-based attacks and the pull-based attacks via some copula function C , we have
P(Iv(t+ 1) = 1|Iv(t) = 0)
= 1− P (Xv(t+ 1) = 0, Yv(t+ 1) = 0|Iv(t) = 0)
= 1− C (Cv (1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)) , 1− α) . (2)
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Note that
P(Iv(t+ 1) = 1|Iv(t) = 1) = (1− β)iv(t). (3)
From Eqs. (1), (2) and (3), we obtain the probability that node v ∈ V is infected at time t+ 1 as:
iv(t+ 1) = P(Iv(t+ 1) = 1)
= P(Iv(t+ 1) = 1|Iv(t) = 1)P(Iv(t) = 1) + P(Iv(t+ 1) = 1|Iv(t) = 0)P(Iv(t) = 0)
= (1− β) · iv(t) + P(Iv(t+ 1) = 1|Iv(t) = 0) · (1− iv(t))
= (1− β)iv(t) +
[
1− C (Cv (1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)) , 1− α)] (1− iv(t)). (4)
We will analyze Eq. (4) for v ∈ V to characterize the effects of the dependence structures C and Cv and the
side-effects of assuming them away. Note that for the special case that the Xv,j’s are independent of each other
and the push-based attacks and the pull-based attacks are also independent of each other, Eq. (4) degenerates to the
model in [19]. Note also that in order to characterize the side-effects of assuming away the dependences, we need to
accommodate the dependences at a higher-level of abstraction than the model parameters α and γ. This is because
the parameters are indeed relatively easier to obtain in experiments/practice (e.g., considering a single compromised
neighbor that is launching the push-based attacks, and considering the pull-based attacks in the absence of the push-
based attacks).
3.2 Epidemic Equilibrium Threshold and Bounds for Equilibrium Infection Probabilities
The concept of epidemic equilibrium threshold [19] naturally extends the well-known concept of epidemic threshold in
that the former describes the condition under which the epidemic spreading converges to a non-negative equilibrium,
whereas the latter traditionally describes the condition under which the epidemic spreading converges to 0 (i.e., the
spreading dies out). Note that α > 0 implies that the spreading will never die out and that α = 0 is necessary for the
spreading to die out. Denote by i∗v the equilibrium infection probability for node v ∈ V. In the equilibrium, Eq. (4)
becomes:
i∗v = (1− β)i∗v +
[
1− C
(
Cv
(
1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,deg(v)
)
, 1− α
)]
(1− i∗v), v ∈ V. (5)
In what follows, Theorem 1 gives a general epidemic equilibrium threshold (i.e., sufficient condition under which the
spreading enters the equilibrium), and Theorem 2 gives a more succinct but more restrictive sufficient condition.
Lemma 3 Let A be the adjacency matrix of G. If
ρ(A) <
(β + α)2
γβ
, (6)
then system (4) has a unique equilibrium (i∗1, . . . , i∗N ) ∈ [0, 1]N .
Proof For any v ∈ V, define fv(x) : [0, 1]N → [0, 1] as
fv(x) =
1− C (Cv (1− γxv,1, . . . , 1− γxv,deg(v)) , 1− α)
β + 1−C (Cv (1− γxv,1, . . . , 1 − γxv,deg(v)) , 1− α) , v = 1, . . . , N,
where x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ [0, 1]N . Define f(·) : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N , where f(x) = (f1(x), . . . , fN (x)). According
to the Banach fixed-point theorem [7], it is sufficient to show that f(x) = x has a unique solution i∗; that is, we need
to prove that f(·) is a contraction mapping.
Let x,y ∈ [0, 1]N . Consider the distance between them in the Euclidean norm,
||f(x) − f(y)|| =
√√√√ N∑
v=1
(fv(x)− fv(y))2 =
√√√√ N∑
v=1
(
βΓv
∆v
)2
,
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where
Γv = C
(
Cv
(
1− γxv,1, . . . , 1− γxv,deg(v)
)
, 1− α)− C (Cv (1− γyv,1, . . . , 1− γyv,deg(v)) , 1− α) ,
∆v =
(
β + 1− C (Cv (1− γxv,1, . . . , 1− γxv,deg(v)) , 1− α))
· (β + 1− C (Cv (1− γyv,1, . . . , 1− γyv,deg(v)) , 1− α)) .
By Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that
|Γv| ≤ γ
deg(v)∑
k=1
|xv,k − yv,k| and ∆v ≥ (β + α)2.
Therefore, we have
||f(x)− f(y)|| ≤ βγ
(β + α)2
√√√√√ N∑
v=1
deg(v)∑
k=1
|xv,k − yv,k|
2.
Moreover,
N∑
v=1
deg(v)∑
k=1
|xv,k − yv,k|
2 = (|x1 − y1|, . . . , |xN − yN |)A2(|x1 − y1|, . . . , |xN − yN |)T
≤ ||(|x1 − y1|, . . . , |xN − yN |)||2||A||2
= ||x− y||2||A||2,
where ||A|| denotes the operator norm of A. Since A is symmetric matrix, we have
||A|| = ρ(A).
From condition (6), it follows that
||f(x)− f(y)|| ≤ βγρ(A)
(β + α)2
||x− y|| < ||x− y||,
which means that f(·) is a contraction mapping.
Theorem 1 (general epidemic equilibrium threshold) Let A be the adjacency matrix of G and D be the diagonal
matrix with the vth (1 ≤ v ≤ N ) diagonal element equal to
h(α, β, γ, i∗v) =
∣∣∣C (Cv (1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,deg(v)) , 1− α)− β∣∣∣ ,
where i∗v is the equilibrium infection probability that satisfies Eq. (5). LetW = D+γA. If condition (6) holds, namely
that system (4) has a unique equilibrium, and the spectral radius ρ(W ) < 1, then limt→∞ iv(t) = i∗v exponentially
for all v ∈ V.
Proof According to Lemma 3, there is a unique solution for i∗v under condition (6). Denote by rv(t) = iv(t) − i∗v.
We want to identify a sufficient condition under which limt→∞ |rv(t)| = 0 for all v ∈ V . Note that
rv(t+ 1) = rv(t)
[
C
(
Cv
(
1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,deg(v)
)
, 1− α
)
− β
]
+ (1− iv(t))
×
[
C
(
Cv
(
1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,deg(v)
)
, 1− α
)
− C (Cv (1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)) , 1− α)] .
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By Lemma 2, we have
|rv(t+ 1)| ≤ |rv(t)|h(α, β, γ, i∗v ) + (1− iv(t))
×
∣∣∣Cv (1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,deg(v))− Cv (1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t))∣∣∣
≤ |rv(t)|h(α, β, γ, i∗v ) + γ (1− iv(t))
deg(v)∑
j=1
|i∗v,j − iv,j(t)|
≤ |rv(t)|h(α, β, γ, i∗v ) + γ
deg(v)∑
j=1
|rv,j(t)|,
where
h(α, β, γ, i∗v) =
∣∣∣C (Cv (1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,deg(v)) , 1− α)− β∣∣∣ .
Define
zv(t+ 1) = zv(t)h(α, β, γ, i
∗
v) + γ
deg(v)∑
j=1
zv,j(t),
with zv(0) ≡ |rv(0)| and zv,j(0) ≡ |rv,j(0)| for j = 1, . . . ,deg(v). We see |rv(t)| ≤ zv(t) for any t. Let z(t) =
(z1(t), . . . , zn(t))
T
. Then, we have the following matrix form
z(t+ 1) =Wz(t) =W t+1z(0), (7)
where W = D + γA, D is the diagonal matrix with diagonal element h(α, β, γ, i∗v), and A is the adjacency matrix
of G. Since matrix W is nonnegative and symmetric, the Spectral Theorem [12] says that ρ(W ) is real. By using the
well-known Gelfand formula, if ρ(W ) < 1, then limt→∞W t = 0 and therefore limt→∞ z(t) = 0. Since
ρ(W ) = lim
t→∞
‖W t ‖1/t and ‖W t ‖∼ [ρ(W )]t , t→∞,
where ‖ · ‖ is the norm in real space Rn, we conclude that ‖ W t ‖ converges to 0 exponentially when ρ(W ) < 1.
This means that the convergence rate of limt→∞ i(t) = i∗ is at least exponential.
Use of the sufficient condition given by Theorem 1 requires to know i∗ (i.e., i∗v for all v), which is difficult to
obtain analytically. It is therefore important to weaken this requirement. Now we present a sufficient condition that
only requires the equilibrium infection probability i∗v for some v (rather than for all v ∈ V). According to [4], we have
ρ(W ) ≤ max
v∈V
h(α, β, γ, i∗v) + γρ(A).
Therefore, a more restrictive (than the one given by Theorem 1) sufficient condition is to require
max
v∈V
h(α, β, γ, i∗v) + γρ(A) < 1, namely ρ(A) <
1−maxv∈V h(α, β, γ, i∗v)
γ
.
According to Eq. (5), we have
h(α, β, γ, i∗v) =
∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗v
∣∣∣∣ .
Therefore, we obtain the following more restrictive, but more succinct, sufficient condition:
Corollary 1 limt→∞ iv(t) = i∗v exponentially for all v ∈ V, if
ρ(A) ≤ min
{
1−maxv∈V |1− β/(1 − i∗v)|
γ
,
(β + α)2
γβ
}
. (8)
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Applying the above sufficient condition still requires to know the minimal and maximal i∗v’s, which is hard to
obtain analytically. Although it is always possible to obtain them numerically, we would want to have some more
general results without relying on numerical solutions. In what follows we present such a sufficient condition (Theo-
rem 2), which requires the following Proposition 1 that presents bounds for the equilibrium infection probability. The
bounds are certainly of independent value.
Proposition 1 (bounds for equilibrium infection probabilities) For any dependence structures C and Cv, which may
be unknown, the equilibrium infection probability i∗v for v ∈ V satisfies i∗− ≤ i∗v ≤ i∗+v , where
i∗− =
γ − β
γ
I{γ > α+ β}+ α
β + α
I{γ ≤ α+ β}, i∗+v =
min
{
α+ γdeg(v)β+1 , 1
}
β +min
{
α+ γdeg(v)β+1 , 1
} .
Proof Rewrite Eq. (5) as
i∗v =
1− C
(
Cv
(
1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,deg(v)
)
, 1− α
)
β + 1− C
(
Cv
(
1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,deg(v)
)
, 1− α
) . (9)
By noticing the monotonicity in (9) and applying Lemma 1, we obtain
max
{
γi∗v,1, . . . , γi
∗
v,deg(v), α
}
β +max
{
γi∗v,1, . . . , γi
∗
v,deg(v), α
} ≤ i∗v ≤ min
{
α+ γ
∑deg(v)
j=1 i
∗
v,j , 1
}
β +min
{
α+ γ
∑deg(v)
j=1 i
∗
v,j , 1
} . (10)
Let us first consider the lower bound. Note that for each v ∈ V,
i∗v ≥ x1
def
=
α
β + α
.
By substituting x1 for i∗v,j in Ineq. (10), we have
i∗v ≥ x2
△
=
max {γx1, α}
β +max {γx1, α} .
By substituting x2 for i∗v,j in Ineq. (10), we obtain x3. By repeating the substitution, we obtain a sequence {xn, n ≥ 1}
with
xn =
max {γxn−1, α}
β +max {γxn−1, α} , x0 = 0.
Since {xn, n ≥ 1} is increasing and bounded, we can get its limit, namely i∗−, by solving the following equation
max{γx, α}
β +max{γx, α} = x.
For the upper bound, note that i∗v ≤ 1β + 1 for v ∈ V. By substituting 1/(β +1) for i
∗
v,j in Ineq. (10), we get i∗+v .
It is useful to know when the bounds in Proposition 1 are tight. For this purpose, we observe that if γβ+1 deg(v) ≈
0, meaning that γ deg(v) << 1 and that the attack-power is not strong, we have i∗+v ≈ i∗− = αβ + α. This means
that the bounds are tight when the attack-power is not strong. On the other hand, Proposition 1 allows us to derive the
following more succinct, but more restrictive (than Corollary 1 and therefore Theorem 1), sufficient condition for the
epidemic spreading converges to the equilibrium (i.e., epidemic equilibrium threshold). The new sufficient condition
involves the bounds i∗− and i∗+v only (i.e., none of the equilibrium probabilities that are hard to obtain analytically).
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Theorem 2 (succinct epidemic equilibrium threshold) The spreading enters the unique equilibrium if
ρ(A) ≤
1−max
v∈V
{
max
{∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗−
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗+v
∣∣∣∣}}
γ
,
where i∗− and i∗+v are defined in Proposition 1.
Proof Note that for any v ∈ V, we have
max
v∈V
h(α, β, γ, i∗v) = max
v∈V
∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗v
∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxv∈V
{
max
{∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗−
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗+v
∣∣∣∣}} .
Note that ∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗−
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1− (β + α)2β ,
which implies
max
v∈V
{
max
{∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗−
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗+v
∣∣∣∣}} ≥ 1− (β + α)2β .
Therefore,
1−max
v∈V
{
max
{∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗−
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣1− β1− i∗+v
∣∣∣∣}} ≤ min{1−maxv∈V |1− β/(1 − i∗v)| , (β + α)2β
}
.
According to Corollary 1, we obtain the desired result.
3.3 Tighter Bounds for Equilibrium Infection Probabilities in Star and Regular Networks
Star networks. A star-shaped network consists of a hub and (N − 1) leaves that are connected only to the hub.
Hence, the adjacency matrix A can be represented as
A =

0 1 . . . 1
1 0 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
. . . . 0
1 0 . . . 0

N×N
The spectral radius is ρ(A) =
√
N − 1. In this case, Eq. (5) becomes:
i∗h =
1− C (δCh (1− γi∗l ) , 1− α)
β + 1− C (δCh (1− γi∗l ) , 1− α)
, (11)
i∗l =
1− C (1− γi∗h, 1− α)
1 + β − C (1− γi∗h, 1− α)
, (12)
where i∗h and i∗l are the equilibrium probabilities that the hub and the leaves are infected, respectively. Note that the
effect of the copula Ch on the equilibrium probabilities only depends on its diagonal section δCh .
In what follows we present two results about the equilibrium infection probabilities, which are not implied by the
above general results that apply to arbitrary network structures. First, we can prove i∗h ≥ i∗l .
Proposition 2 For the star networks, it holds that i∗h ≥ i∗l .
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Proof Denote by
f(x) =
1− C (δCh (1− γx) , 1− α)
β + 1− C (δCh (1− γx) , 1− α)
and g(x) = 1−C (1− γx, 1− α)
1 + β − C (1− γx, 1− α)
where x ∈ [0, 1]. Since δCh(x) ≤ x, we have f(x) ≥ g(x). Suppose i∗h < i∗l and (i∗h, i∗l ) is a solution to Eqs.
(11) and (12). Then, i∗h = f(i∗l ) = g−1(i∗l ) < i∗l . Since g(x) is increasing in x and so is g−1, we have i∗l ≤
g(i∗l ) and f(i∗l ) < i∗l ≤ g(i∗l ), which contradicts with f(x) ≥ g(x) for x ∈ [0, 1].
Second, we present refined bounds for equilibrium infection probabilities i∗h and i∗l . The bounds are useful because
even in the case of star networks, it is hard to derive analytic expressions and infeasible to numerically compute
(especially for complex dependence structures) i∗h and i∗l .
Proposition 3 (tighter upper bounds for the equilibrium infection probabilities in star networks) For star networks
and regardless of the dependence structures (which can be unknown), we have i∗− ≤ i∗h ≤ i∗+h and i∗− ≤ i∗l ≤
i∗+l , where i∗− is defined in Proposition 1 and
i∗+h =
1
β + 1
I
{
1
β + 1
≥ 1− α
(N − 1)γ
}
+
(N − 1)γ − α− β +
√
((N − 1)γ − α− β)2 + 4(N − 1)γα
2(N − 1)γ I
{
1
β + 1
<
1− α
(N − 1)γ
}
.
and
i∗+l =
1
β + 1
I
{
1
β + 1
≥ 1− α
γ
}
+
γ − α− β +
√
(γ − α− β)2 + 4γα
2γ
I
{
1
β + 1
<
1− α
γ
}
.
Proof The lower bound i∗− is the same as in Proposition 1. Let’s focus on i∗+h . From Ineq. (10), we have
i∗h ≤
min{α+ (N − 1)γi∗l , 1}
β +min{α+ (N − 1)γi∗l , 1}
△
= f(i∗l ).
Since the right-hand side of the above inequality increases in i∗l , by Proposition 2 we have
i∗h ≤ f(i∗h),
and therefore i∗h ≤ i∗+h , where i∗+h is the solution to equation
x = f(x). (13)
For the upper bound i∗+l , we can similarly obtain the desired result by solving equation
x = f
(
x
N − 1
)
. (14)
Now we explain why the upper bounds i∗+h and i
∗+
l given by Proposition 3 are smaller (i.e., tighter) than the
general upper bounds that can be derived from Proposition 1 by instantiating G = (V,E) as star networks. To see this,
we note that i∗+h is the solution to Eq. (13) and i∗+h ≤ 1β+1 , meaning that
i∗+h ≤
min
{
α+ (N − 1) γβ+1 , 1
}
β +min
{
α+ (N − 1) γβ+1 , 1
} ,
where the right-hand side of the inequality is exactly the upper bound that can be derived from Proposition 1 by sub-
stituting deg(v) with the degree of the hub. This means that i∗+h is smaller than the upper bound given by Proposition
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1. Similarly, we can show that i∗+l is smaller than the upper bound given by Proposition 1. Moreover, by comparing
(13) and (14), we see that i∗+h ≥ i∗+l . Since the lower bound i∗− is the same as the lower bound given by Proposition
1, we conclude that the bounds given by Proposition 3 are tighter than the bounds given by Proposition 1.
To see the tightness of the bounds given by Proposition 3, we consider two combinations of dependence structures:
(C,Cv)=(Gaussian,Frank) and (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Clayton) with parameters σ = θ = ξ = 0.1 as reviewed in
Section 2. Figure 1 plots i∗h, i∗l , i∗−, i
∗+
h , and i
∗+
l for N = 3, . . . , 81 with (α, β, γ) = (0.5, 0.1, 0.1); all these
parameter settings satisfy condition (8). We observe that the upper bound i∗+h becomes flat for N ≥ 5, because it
causes i∗+h =
1
β+1 (i.e., independent of N ); whereas, the upper bound i∗+l is flat because it is always independent
of N . We observe that the upper bound for hub node, i∗+h , becomes extremely tight for dense star networks with
N > 40. However, the upper bound for leave nodes almost always exhibits that i∗+l − i∗l ≈ 0.011 (i.e., the upper
bound overestimates about 0.88 infected nodes for a star network of N = 80 nodes). In any case, the upper bounds
only somewhat overestimate the numerical solutions i∗v’s and thus can be used for decision-making purpose when i∗v’s
are infeasible to compute.
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Figure 1: Star networks: upper bound i∗+h for hub (i∗+l for leaves) vs. numerical solution i∗h for hub (i∗l for leaves) vs.
lower bound i∗− (for both hub and leaves) with respect to (α, β, γ) = (0.5, 0.1, 0.1) and (C,Cv).
Regular networks. For regular networks, each node v ∈ V has degree d for some d ∈ [1, N − 1] and ρ(A) = d.
According to Proposition 1, we have
i∗v =
1− C (Cv (1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,d) , 1− α)
β + 1−C (Cv (1− γi∗v,1, . . . , 1− γi∗v,d) , 1− α) , v ∈ V.
Now we want to present refined bounds for equilibrium infection probability i∗v.
Proposition 4 (tighter upper bound for the equilibrium infection probability in regular networks) For regular network
G = (V,E) and regardless of the dependence structures (which can be unknown), we have i∗− ≤ i∗v ≤ i∗+ for any
v ∈ V, where i∗− is defined in Proposition 1 and
i∗+ =
1
β + 1
I
{
1
β + 1
≥ 1− α
γd
}
+
γd− α− β +
√
(γd− α− β)2 + 4γαd
2γd
I
{
1
β + 1
<
1− α
γd
}
.
Proof Define function
f(x) =
min{α+ γdx, 1}
β +min{α+ γdx, 1}
and a sequence {xn, n ≥ 0} with xn = f(xn−1), x0 = 1/(β + 1). Observe that for all v ∈ V, we have i∗v ≤ x0
and hence from Ineq. (10), it follows that i∗v ≤ x1 for all v ∈ V. By repeating this process, we have i∗v ≤ xn for
all n. Since f(x) is increasing and x1 ≤ x0, xn is decreasing in n. Thus, we have i∗v ≤ i∗+, which is the solution
of the equation x = f(x). If 1β+1 ≥ 1−αγd , then i∗+ = 1β+1 ; otherwise, i∗+ is the positive solution to equation
γdx2 + (α+ β − γd)x− α = 0. Thus, we obtain the desired result.
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Note that the upper bound i∗+ given by Proposition 4 is smaller than the upper bound i∗+v obtained by instantiating
deg(v) = d in Proposition 1, because i∗+v is exactly the x1 defined in the proof of Proposition 4. To see the tightness of
bounds i∗− and i∗+ given by Proposition 4, we consider (C,Cv)=(Gaussian,Frank) and (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Clayton)
with parameters σ = θ = ξ = 0.1 as reviewed in Section 2. Figure 2 plots numerical i∗v, i∗− and i∗+ with respect
to node degree d = 2, . . . , 80 with (α, β, γ) = (0.5, 0.1, 0.01); all these parameter settings satisfy condition (8).
We observe that i∗+v becomes flat for sufficiently dense regular networks. This is because i∗+v = 1β+1 when d ≥
(1−α)(β+1)
γ . For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian,Frank), we further observe that the upper bound i∗+v is reasonably tight especially
for relatively sparse regular networks, with i∗+v − i∗v < 0.021 for d < 20 (i.e., for a sparse regular network of
N = 1000 nodes, the upper bound only overestimates at most 21 infected nodes). Even for dense regular network
with d > 20, we have i∗+v − i∗v ≤ 0.038 (i.e., for a dense regular network of N = 1000 nodes, the upper bound
only overestimates at most 38 infected nodes), where equality holds for d = 54. For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Clayton),
we also observe that the upper bound i∗+v is tight especially for relatively sparse regular networks with d < 20 and
i∗+v − i∗v < 0.021 (i.e., for a sparse regular network of N = 1000 nodes, the upper bound only overestimates at most
21 infected nodes). Even for dense regular network with d > 20, we have i∗+v − i∗v ≤ 0.039, where equality holds
for d = 54. This means that for decision-making purpose, the defender can use the upper bound i∗+v instead of the
numerical solution i∗v, especially when i∗v is infeasible to compute.
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Figure 2: Regular networks: upper bound i∗+v vs. numerical solution i∗v vs. lower bound i∗−v with respect to
(C,Cv , α, β, γ)
3.4 Approximating Equilibrium Infection Probabilities in ER and Power-law Networks
For star and regular networks, we have derived tighter bounds for equilibrium infection probabilities (than the general
bounds given by Proposition 1). Unfortunately, we do not know how to derive tighter bounds for ER and power-law
networks. As an alternative, we propose to approximate equilibrium infection probabilities by taking advantage of the
upper and lower bounds. The approximation is useful because it is often smaller than the upper bound, which never
underestimates, but may substantially overestimate, the threats in terms of equilibrium infection probabilities. That
is, the approximation method can lead to more cost-effective defense than the upper bound.
The approximation method is the following: We first compute lower bounds, upper bounds, and numerical solu-
tions for a feasible number of instances of (G, C,Cv , α, β, γ), based on given computer resources. We then use the
resulting data to derive (via statistical methods) some function of the lower and upper bounds. For even larger G of
the same type as well as (C,Cv) of the same kind, the resulting function would be smaller than the upper bound and
would not underestimate the equilibrium infection probabilities. The key insight is that we can compute, for networks
of any size, the upper and lower bounds according to Proposition 1. This means that we can approximate the equi-
librium infection probabilities for arbitrarily large networks, for which it is often infeasible to numerically (let alone
analytically) compute the equilibrium infection probabilities.
To illustrate the approximation method, we also consider (C,Cv)=(Gaussian,Frank) and (C,Cv)=(Gaussian,
Clayton) with parameters σ = θ = ξ = 0.1 as reviewed in Section 2. We use the erdos.renyi.game generator
of the igraph package in the R system to generate a random ER network of N = 1000 nodes and edge proba-
bility 0.01; the resulting network instance has spectral radius 11.38045. We use the static.power.law.game
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generator of the igraph package in the R system to generate a random power-law network of N = 1000 nodes,
5000 edges, and power-law exponent 2.1 (note that 2.1 is the power-law exponent of the Internet AS-level net-
work [6]); the resulting network instance has spectral radius 22.97582. We consider combinations of (α, β, γ) that
satisfy condition (8), where α ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}, β ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9},
γ ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1}. It turns out that for (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Frank), the ER
network has 307 combinations of (α, β, γ) that satisfy condition (8); the power-law network has 125 combinations
of (α, β, γ) that satisfy condition (8), because the spectral radius is larger. For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Clayton), the ER
network has 307 combinations of (α, β, γ) that satisfy condition (8); the power-law network has 126 combinations of
(α, β, γ) that satisfy condition (8).
We compute equilibrium infection probability i∗v numerically by solving Eqs. (5) for v ∈ V via the BB package
in the R system. We compute the upper and lower bounds, namely i∗− and i∗+v , according to Proposition 1. Since
it is infeasible to numerically compute i∗v for large networks, we propose to approximate i∗v for node v ∈ V via
î∗v =
1
2
(
i˜∗v + i
∗+
v
)
, where
i˜∗v = f(C,Cv)(i
∗−, i∗+v ,deg(v)) = k0 + k1i
∗− + k2i
∗+
v + k3 deg(v)
can be statistically derived from the data. Note that the heuristic function î∗v could be refined via more extensive
numerical studies. We define the approximation error for network G as errG =
∑
v∈V(î
∗
v − i∗v), because
∑
v∈V i
∗
v is
an important factor for cyber defense decision-making. For practical use, it is desired that errG ≥ 0, meaning that
the defender never underestimates the threats, and at the same time errG ≈ 0, meaning that the defender does not
overestimate the threats (i.e., does not overprovision defense resources) too much.
ER networks. For the ER network, we obtain the following formulas :
• For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Frank), we have î∗v = −0.01759 + 0.3142i∗− + 0.7294i∗+v − 0.0002575 deg(v).
• For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Clayton), we have î∗v = −0.0174076+0.3150585i∗−+0.7281992i∗+v −0.0002596 deg(v).
For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Frank), the average of the errG’s over the 307 combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) is 46,
meaning that the approximation method only overestimates 46 infected nodes in an ER network of 1000 nodes. In
comparison, the average of the
∑
v∈V(i
∗+
v − i∗v)’s over the 307 combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) is 93, meaning that
the upper bound overestimates 93 infected nodes (i.e., the approximation method is indeed better); the average of
the
∑
v∈V(i
− − i∗v)’s is -52.7, meaning that the lower bound underestimates 52.7 infected nodes in an ER network
of 1000 nodes. Finally, we note that among the 307 combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ), the maximum errG is 165.2,
which is elaborated in Figure 3(a) and will be discussed further, and the minimum errG is 4.1, which is elaborated in
Figure 3(b) and will be discussed further as well. For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Clayton), the average of the errG’s over the
307 combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) is 46.5, meaning that the approximation method only overestimates 46.5 infected
nodes in an ER network of 1000 nodes. In comparison, the average of the
∑
v∈V(i
∗+
v −i∗v)’s over the 307 combinations
of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) is 93, meaning that the upper bound overestimates 93 infected nodes in an ER network of 1000
nodes; the average of the 307
∑
v∈V(i
− − i∗v)’s is -52.5, meaning that the lower bound underestimates 52.5 infected
nodes in an ER network of 1000 nodes. Among the 307 instances, the maximum errG is 165.0, which is elaborated
in Figure 3(d) and will be discussed further, and the minimum errG is 4.2, which is elaborated in Figure 3(e) and will
be discussed further. In summary, cyber defense decision-making can be based on the approximation method, which
takes advantage of the upper and lower bounds and would be better (smaller) than the upper bound.
As a side-product, we would like to highlight the phenomenon that the equilibrium infection probability i∗v in-
creases with node degree deg(v). This phenomenon was observed in [19] in the absence of dependence, and persists
in the presence of dependence as we elaborate below. We consider i∗+v , i∗v, î∗v and i∗− with respect to distinct node de-
grees, by taking the average over the nodes of the same degree when needed. For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian,Frank), Figures
3(a)-3(b) plot the infection probabilities corresponding to the (α, β, γ) that leads to the maximum and minimum errG,
respectively; Figure 3(c) plots the infection probabilities averaged over the 307 combinations of (α, β, γ) that satisfy
condition (8). For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian,Clayton), Figures 3(d)-3(e) plot the infection probabilities corresponding to
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Figure 3: ER networks: upper bound vs. approximation vs. numerical solution vs. lower bound with respect to
(C,Cv , α, β, γ) or (C,Cv).
the (α, β, γ) that leads to the maximum and minimum errG, respectively; Figure 4(f) plots the infection probabilities
averaged over the 307 combinations of (α, β, γ) that satisfy condition (8). We observe that the approximation î∗v
can slightly underestimate the infection probability i∗v for node v of degree deg(v) ≤ 5, but the overall estimation∑
v∈V î
∗
v is still above the actual threats
∑
v∈V i
∗
v (as mentioned above). More importantly, we observe that i∗v (solid
curves) increases with deg(v). This hints that there might be some universal scaling laws, in the presence or absence
of dependence. It is an interesting future work to identify the possible scaling law.
Power-law networks. For power-law networks, we obtain the following formulas in a similar fashion:
• For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Frank), we have î∗v = −0.007395 + 0.34705i∗− + 0.67205i∗+v + 0.00013505 deg(v).
• For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Clayton), we have î∗v = −0.007365 + 0.34765i∗− +0.6714i∗+v +0.00013525 deg(v).
For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Frank), the average of the errG’s over the 125 combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) is 25, mean-
ing that the approximation only overestimates 25 infected nodes in a power-law network of 1000 nodes. In com-
parison, the average of the
∑
v∈V(i
∗+
v − i∗v)’s over the 125 combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) is 50.8, meaning that
the upper bound overestimates 50.8 infected nodes (i.e., the approximation method is better); the average of the∑
v∈V(i
− − i∗v)’s is -26, meaning that the lower bound underestimates 26 infected nodes. Among the 125 combina-
tions of (C,Cv , α, β, γ), the maximum errG is 84.5, which is elaborated in Figure 4(a) and will be discussed further,
and the minimum errG is 7.1, which is elaborated in Figure 4(b). For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian, Clayton), the average of the
errG’s over the 126 combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) is 25.4, meaning that the approximation only overestimates 25.4
infected nodes in a power-law network of 1000 nodes. In comparison, the average of the
∑
v∈V(i
∗+
v − i∗v)’s over the
126 combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) is 50.8, meaning that the upper bound overestimates 50.8 infected nodes; the
average of the 126
∑
v∈V(i
− − i∗v)’s is -26, meaning that the lower bound underestimates 26 infected nodes. Among
the 126 instances, the maximum errG is 84.5, which is elaborated in Figure 4(d), and the minimum errG is 7.2, which
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is elaborated in Figure 4(e). In summary, cyber defense decision-making can use the approximation method, which
takes advantage of the upper and lower bounds.
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Figure 4: Power-law networks: upper bound vs. approximation vs. numerical solution vs. lower bound with respect to
(C,Cv , α, β, γ) or (C,Cv). In Figures 4(b) and 4(e), the approximation result matches the numerical solution almost
perfectly.
We also would like to highlight the phenomenon that the equilibrium infection probability i∗v increases with node
degree deg(v) in power-law networks. Similarly, for (C,Cv)=(Gaussian,Frank), Figures 4(a)-4(b) plot respectively
the infection probabilities corresponding to the (α, β, γ) that leads to the maximum and minimum errG, and Figure
4(c) plots the infection probabilities averaged over the 125 combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) that satisfy condition
(8). For (C,Cv)=(Gaussian,Clayton), Figures 4(a)-4(b) plot respectively the infection probabilities corresponding to
the (α, β, γ) that leads to the maximum errG, and Figure 4(c) plots the infection probabilities averaged over the 126
combinations of (C,Cv , α, β, γ) that satisfy condition (8). We observe that the approximation î∗v never underestimates
the infection probability i∗v for any node v. We also observe that i∗v (solid curves) increases with deg(v), but exhibits
a higher nonlinearity when compared with the ER networks.
3.5 Bounds for Non-Equilibrium Infection Probabilities
It is important to characterize the behavior of iv(t) even if it never enters any equilibrium. For this purpose, we want
to seek some bounds for iv(t), no matter whether the system converges to an equilibrium or not. Such characterization
is useful because, for example, the upper bound can be used for the worst-case scenario decision-making. It is worth
mentioning that non-equilibrium states/behaviors are always hard to characterize.
Proposition 5 (bounds for non-equilibrium probabilities) Let limt→∞iv(t) and limt→∞iv(t) denote the upper and
lower limits of iv(t), v ∈ V. Then,
i−v ≤ limt→∞iv(t) ≤ limt→∞iv(t) ≤ i+v ,
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where
i−v =

1− C(δCv (1− γν), 1− α)
β + 1− C(δCv (1− γν), 1 − α) , C(δCv(1− γν), 1 − α) ≥ β,
[β −C(δCv (1− γν), 1− α)] (1− µv) + 1− β, otherwise,
and
i+v =

1− C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α)
β + 1− C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α) , C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α) > β[
β − C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α)] (1− i−v ) + 1− β, otherwise
with δCv (1− γν) = Cv(1− γν, . . . , 1− γν), µv = max {1− β,min{γdeg(v) + α, 1}} and ν = min{1− β, α}.
Proof By observing the monotonicity in Eq. (4), we note that iv(t) ≥ ν for all v ∈ V. Replacing iv,j(t) with ν in
Eq. (4) yields
iv(t+ 1) ≥ (1− β)iv(t) + [1− C (δCv (1− γν), 1 − α)] (1− iv(t))
= [C (δCv(1− γν), 1 − α)− β] iv(t) + 1− C (δCv(1− γν), 1 − α) .
If C (δCv (1− γν), 1− α) > β, by taking the lower limit on both sides we obtain
limt→∞iv(t+ 1) ≥
1− C (δCv(1− γν), 1 − α)
β + 1− C (δCv (1− γν), 1− α)
.
If C (δCv (1− γν), 1− α) ≤ β, we have
iv(t+ 1) ≥ [C (δCv (1− γν), 1− α)− β]µv + 1− C (δCv (1− γν), 1− α)
= [β − C(δCv(1− γν), 1− α)] (1− µv) + 1− β.
Hence, limt→∞iv(t) ≥ i−v .
For the upper bound, by applying Lemma 1 to Eq. (4) we have
iv(t+ 1) ≤ (1− β)iv(t) + [1−max {max {2− γdeg(v)− α, 1− α} − 1, 0}] (1− iv(t))
= (1− β)iv(t) + min {γdeg(v) + α, 1} (1− iv(t))
≤ max {1− β,min{γdeg(v) + α, 1}} = µv. (15)
By replacing iv,j with µv,j’s in Eq. (4) yields
iv(t+ 1) ≤ (1− β)iv(t) +
[
1− C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1 − γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α)] (1− iv(t))
=
[
C
(
Cv
(
1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)
)
, 1− α) − β] iv(t)
+1− C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α) .
If C
(
Cv
(
1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)
)
, 1− α) > β, then
limt→∞ ≤
1−C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α)
β + 1− C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α) .
If C
(
Cv
(
1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)
)
, 1− α) ≤ β, then we have
limt→∞iv(t+ 1) ≤ limt→∞
{[
C
(
Cv
(
1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)
)
, 1− α)− β] iv(t)
+1− C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α)}
≤ [C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α)− β] limt→∞iv(t)
+1− C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α)
≤ [C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α)− β] i−v
+1− C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α) .
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Hence, we have limt→∞iv(t+ 1) ≤ i+v .
When are the bounds tight? It is important to know when the bounds are tight because the defender can use the
upper bound i+v for decision-making, especially when the spreading never enters any equilibrium. Note that when
γ << 1, it holds that
C(δCv (1− γν), 1− α) ≈ C(1, 1− α) = 1− α,
and
C
(
Cv
(
1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)
)
, 1− α) ≈ C (Cv (1, . . . , 1) , 1− α) = 1− α.
Therefore, in the case γ << 1 and α+ β < 1, we have
i−v ≈
1−C(δCv (1− γν), 1− α)
β + 1− C(δCv (1− γν), 1− α)
≈ α
β + α
,
i+v ≈
1−C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α)
β + 1− C (Cv (1− γµv,1, . . . , 1− γµv,deg(v)) , 1− α) ≈ αβ + α.
This means that the bounds are tight when the attack-power is not strong.
In the case γ deg(v) << 1 and α+ β ≥ 1, we can similarly have
i−v ≈ α(2 − α− β), i+v ≈ (β + α− 1) [1− α(2 − α− β)] + 1− β.
Therefore, the difference between the upper bound and lower bound is
i+v − i−v ≈ α(α + β − 1)2.
Therefore, the bounds are tight when (α+ β) is not far from 1 or α is close to zero.
Are the equilibrium bounds always tighter than the non-equilibrium bounds? We observe the following: under
the condition γ deg(v) << 1, we have i∗− ≈ i∗+v ≈ α/(α+β); under the condition γ deg(v) << 1 and the condition
α + β < 1, we have i−v ≈ i+v ≈ α/(α + β). This means that the equilibrium bounds are widely applicable than
the same non-equilibrium bounds, namely that the equilibrium bounds are strictly tighter than the non-equilibrium
bounds.
4 Side-Effects of Assuming Away the Dependences
In the above we have characterized epidemic equilibrium thresholds, equilibrium infection probabilities, and non-
equilibrium infection probabilities while accommodating arbitrary dependences. In order to characterize the side-
effects of assuming away the dependences, we consider the degree of dependences as captured by the concordance
order between copulas (reviewed in Section 2). In order to draw cyber security insights at a higher level of abstraction,
we also consider three kinds of qualitative dependences: positive dependence, independence and negative dependence,
whose degrees of dependence are in decreasing order. Specifically, positive (negative) dependence between the push-
based attacks means
1− Cv
(
1− γiv,1, . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)
) ≥ (≤)1− deg(v)∏
j=1
(1− γiv,j) ,
and positive (negative) dependence between the push-based attacks and the pull-based attacks means
1− C (Cv (1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)) , 1− α) ≥ (≤)1− (1− α)Cv (1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)) ,
where equality means independence. To simplify the notations, let pd stand for positive dependence, ind stand
for independence, and nd stand for negative dependence. Let x ∈ {pd, ind, nd} denote the dependence structure
between the push-based attacks and the pull-based attacks, as captured by copula C . Let y ∈ {pd, ind, nd} denote the
dependence structure between the push-based attacks, as captured by copula Cv. Therefore, the dependence structures
can be represented by a pair (x, y).
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4.1 Side-Effects on Equilibrium Infection Probabilities and Thresholds
For fixed G = (V,E), α, β, γ, we compare the effects of two groups of dependences (i.e., copulas) {C,Cv , v ∈ V} and
{C ′, C ′v , v ∈ V}. Corresponding to the two groups of copulas, we denote by iv(t) and i′v(t) the respective infection
probabilities of node v ∈ V at time t ≥ 0. Let i∗v,x,y denote the equilibrium infection probability of node v, namely i∗v,
under dependence structure (x, y).
Side-effects on the equilibrium infection probabilities. We present a result about the impact of the dependence
structures on the equilibrium infection probabilities. This result will allow us to derive the side-effects of assuming
away the dependences.
Proposition 6 (comparison between the effects of different dependence structures on equilibrium infection probabil-
ities) Suppose the condition underlying Lemma 3 holds, namely ρ(A) < (β + α)
2
γβ so that system (4) has a unique
equilibrium. If for all v ∈ V, we have
C
(
Cv
(
u1, . . . , udeg(v)
)
, u0
) ≤ C ′ (C ′v (u1, . . . , udeg(v)) , u0) , (16)
where 0 ≤ uj ≤ 1 for j = 0, . . . ,deg(v), then we have i∗ ≥ i′∗.
Proof Note that i∗ and i′∗ are respectively the unique positive solutions of f(i∗) = 0 and g(i′∗) = 0, where
f = (f1, . . . , fN ) and g = (g1, . . . , gN ) with
fv(i) =
[
1− C (Cv (1− γiv,1, . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)) , 1− α)] (1− iv)− βiv , v ∈ V
gv(i) =
[
1− C ′ (C ′v (1− γiv,1, . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)) , 1− α)] (1− iv)− βiv, v ∈ V.
Since f(0) = g(0) = α > 0 and f ≥ g, we have g(i∗) ≤ f(i∗) = 0. Since both f and g are continuous, we have
i′∗ ≤ i∗.
The cyber security insights/implications of Proposition 6 is: The stronger the negative (positive) dependences
between the attack events, the lower (higher) the equilibrium infection probabilities. More specifically, we have
i∗v,pd,y ≥ i∗v,ind,y ≥ i∗v,nd,y for any y ∈ {pd, ind, nd} and i∗v,x,pd ≥ i∗v,x,ind ≥ i∗v,x,nd for any x ∈ {pd, ind, nd}.
Therefore, the side-effects of assuming away the dependences between attack events are: If the positive (negative)
dependence is assumed away, the resulting equilibrium infection probability underestimates (overestimates) the actual
equilibrium infection probability. This means the following: when the positive dependence between attack events is
assumed away, the cyber defense decisions based on i∗v,ind,ind (< i∗v,pd,pd) can render the deployed defense useless;
when the negative dependence is assumed away between attack events, the cyber defense decisions based on i∗v,ind,ind
(> i∗v,nd,nd) can waste defense resources. We will use numerical examples below to confirm these insights. Another
important insight is: if the defender can seek to impose negative dependence on the cyber attacks, the cyber defense
effect is better of. We believe that this insight will shed light on research of future cyber defense mechanisms, and
highlights the value of theoretical studies in terms of their practical guidance.
Side-effects on the epidemic equilibrium threshold. Corollary 1 gives a sufficient condition under which the
epidemic spreading enters the equilibrium. Here we define
τ
def
= min
{
1−maxv∈V |1− β/(1 − i∗v)|
γ
,
(β + α)2
γβ
}
, (17)
with respect to a group of copulas {C,Cv , v ∈ V}. According to Eq. (8), ρ(A) ≤ τ means that the epidemic spreading
converges to the equilibrium. Similarly, we can define τ ′ with respect to another group of copulas {C ′, C ′v, v ∈ V}.
We want to compare τ and τ ′ with respect to the relation between {C,Cv , v ∈ V} and {C ′, C ′v , v ∈ V}.
19
Proposition 7 Under the conditions of Proposition 6, namely ρ(A) < (β + α)
2
γβ
so that system (4) has a unique
equilibrium and C
(
Cv
(
u1, . . . , udeg(v)
)
, u0
) ≤ C ′ (C ′v (u1, . . . , udeg(v)) , u0) for all v ∈ V, we have
(i) if 1− β ≤ i∗−, then τ ≤ τ ′;
(ii) if 1− β ≥ i∗+, then τ ≥ τ ′,
where i∗+ def= maxv∈V i∗+v , i∗− and i∗+v are defined in Proposition 1.
Proof According to Proposition 1, we know that i∗− ≤ i∗v ≤ i∗+, which implies β1−i∗− ≤ β1−i∗v ≤
β
1−i∗+
. According
to Eq. (17), τ is decreasing in maxv∈V |1− β1−i∗v |. Therefore, τ is decreasing in i
∗
v when 1− β ≤ i∗−, and increasing
in i∗v when 1− β ≥ i∗+. By Proposition 6, we get the desired results.
In order to draw insights while simplifying the discussion, let τx,y denote the τ as defined in Eq. (17) with respect
to dependence structures (x, y). The cyber security implication of Proposition 7 is: First, under some circumstances,
the stronger the dependences between the cyber attacks, the more restrictive the epidemic equilibrium threshold. More
specifically, under the condition 1− β ≤ i∗−, we have for all v ∈ V:
τnd,y ≥ τind,y ≥ τpd,y and τx,nd ≥ τx,ind ≥ τx,pd.
This means that under the above circumstances, assuming away the positive dependences between the attacks will
lead to incorrect epidemic equilibrium threshold, and assuming away the negative dependences between the make the
epidemic equilibrium threshold unnecessarily restrictive. This further highlights the value for the defender to render
the dependences negative, provided that 1− β ≤ i∗−.
Second, under certain other circumstances, the stronger the dependences, the less restrictive the epidemic equilib-
rium threshold. More specifically, under the condition 1− β ≥ i∗+, we have
τnd,y ≤ τind,y ≤ τpd,y and τx,nd ≤ τx,ind ≤ τx,pd.
This means that assuming away the negative dependences between the attacks will lead to incorrect epidemic equi-
librium threshold, and assuming away the positive dependences will make the epidemic equilibrium threshold un-
necessarily restrictive. Moreover, while rendering the dependences negative can lead to smaller equilibrium infection
probabilities, it imposes a very restrictive epidemic equilibrium threshold when 1 − β ≥ i∗+. This means that when
applying the above insights to guide practice, the defender must be aware of the parameter regions corresponding to
the cyber security posture.
Numerical examples. In order to illustrate the above analytic results, we consider the example of star network with
N = 11 nodes. We assume that the dependence between the push-based and the pull-based attacks can be captured
by the Gaussian copula C with parameter σ and the dependence between the push-based attacks launched from the
leaves against the hub can be captured by copula Cv, which is the Clayton copula with parameter θ. These two
copulas are reviewed in Section 2. We consider two sets of parameters (α, β, γ) = (0.2, 0.5, 0.05) and (α, β, γ) =
(0.4, 0.7, 0.05). From Eqs. (11) and (12), we can compute the equilibrium infection probabilities i∗h for the hub and
i∗l for the leaves, and the threshold τ as defined in (17). Note that the copulas are increasing in their parameters in
the concordance order. By Proposition 6, both i∗h and i∗l are decreasing in θ (σ) given σ (θ), as confirmed by Tables
1-2. Note that for star networks, the condition 1 − β ≥ i∗+ in Proposition 7 can be relaxed as 1 − β ≥ i∗+h , where
i∗+h is defined in Proposition 3. When (α, β, γ) = (0.2, 0.5, 0.05), it is easy to verify 1 − β ≥ i∗+h , meaning that τ
is decreasing in θ (σ) for fixed σ (θ). This is confirmed in Table 1. When (α, β, γ) = (0.4, 0.7, 0.05), the condition
1 − β ≤ i∗− in Proposition 7 is satisfied, meaning that τ is increasing in θ (σ) for fixed σ (θ). This is confirmed in
Table 2. These examples also confirm the conclusion i∗h ≥ i∗l given by Proposition 2.
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θ
σ = 0.5 (nd) σ = 0 (ind) σ = −0.5 (pd)
i∗
h
i∗
l
τ i∗
h
i∗
l
τ i∗
h
i∗
l
τ
1.0 .35 .29 14.11 .38 .30 14.31 .40 .31 14.40
1.5 .35 .29 14.11 .38 .30 14.30 .40 .31 14.39
2.0 .35 .29 14.11 .38 .30 14.30 .39 .31 14.39
2.5 .34 .29 14.11 .38 .30 14.30 .39 .31 14.39
3.0 .34 .29 14.11 .37 .30 14.30 .39 .30 14.39
3.5 .34 .29 14.11 .37 .30 14.30 .39 .30 14.38
4.0 .34 .29 14.11 .37 .30 14.30 .39 .30 14.38
4.5 .34 .29 14.11 .37 .30 14.29 .38 .30 14.38
5.0 .34 .29 14.11 .37 .30 14.29 .38 .30 14.38
5.5 .34 .29 14.11 .37 .30 14.29 .38 .30 14.38
6.0 .33 .29 14.11 .36 .30 14.29 .38 .30 14.38
Table 1: (α, β, γ) = (0.2, 0.5, 0.05)
θ
σ = 0.5 (nd) σ = 0 (ind) σ = −0.5 (pd)
i∗
h
i∗
l
τ i∗
h
i∗
l
τ i∗
h
i∗
l
τ
1.0 .39 .37 17.11 .41 .37 16.09 .44 .38 15.20
1.5 .39 .37 17.15 .41 .37 16.16 .43 .38 15.29
2.0 .39 .37 17.18 .41 .37 16.21 .43 .38 15.36
2.5 .39 .37 17.21 .41 .37 16.26 .43 .38 15.43
3.0 .38 .37 17.24 .41 .37 16.31 .43 .38 15.50
3.5 .38 .37 17.27 .41 .37 16.35 .43 .38 15.56
4.0 .38 .37 17.30 .41 .37 16.39 .43 .38 15.62
4.5 .38 .37 17.31 .41 .37 16.43 .42 .38 15.67
5.0 .38 .37 17.33 .41 .37 16.47 .42 .38 15.72
5.5 .38 .37 17.35 .40 .37 16.50 .42 .38 15.77
6.0 .38 .37 17.37 .40 .37 16.53 .42 .38 15.81
Table 2: (α, β, γ) = (0.4, 0.7, 0.05)
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4.2 Side-Effects on the Non-Equilibrium Infection Probabilities
We now investigate the side-effects on the non-equilibrium infection probabilities i(t) = (i1(t), . . . , iN (t)), no matter
whether the epidemic spreading converges to equilibrium or not.
Proposition 8 (side-effects on the non-equilibrium infection probabilities) Consider two vectors of infection prob-
abilities i(t0) ≥ i′(t0) at some time t0 ≥ 0. Let µ = maxv∈V µv = max{1 − β,min{α + γDeg, 1}}, where
Deg = maxv∈V deg(v). If condition (16) holds and
min
v∈V
{C (δCv (1− γµ) , 1− α)} ≥ β, (18)
then i(t) ≥ i′(t) for all t ≥ t0.
Proof We need to show that i(t+ 1) ≥ i′(t+ 1) when i(t) ≥ i′(t) is given. Note that
iv(t+ 1) =
[
C
(
Cv
(
1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)
)
, 1− α) − β] (iv(t)− 1) + 1− β,
i′v(t+ 1) =
[
C ′
(
C ′v
(
1− γi′v,1(t), . . . , 1− γi′v,deg(v)(t)
)
, 1− α
)
− β
]
(i′v(t)− 1) + 1− β.
According to Ineq. (15) in the proof of Proposition 5, we have iv(t) ≤ µ for all v ∈ V. Then, conditions (16) and (18)
imply
C
(
Cv
(
1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)
)
, 1− α)− β ≥ 0,
C ′
(
C ′v
(
1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)
)
, 1− α)− β ≥ 0.
Since i(t) ≥ i′(t), we have
iv(t+ 1) ≥
[
C
(
Cv
(
1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)
)
, 1− α)− β] (i′v(t)− 1) + 1− β
≥ [C ′ (C ′v (1− γiv,1(t), . . . , 1− γiv,deg(v)(t)) , 1 − α) − β] (i′v(t)− 1) + 1− β
≥
[
C ′
(
C ′v
(
1− γi′v,1(t), . . . , 1− γi′v,deg(v)(t)
)
, 1− α
)
− β
]
(i′v(t)− 1) + 1− β
= i′v(t+ 1).
Since the above holds for all v ∈ V, we obtain the desired result.
t = 6 t = 7 t = 8
iv(t) i
′
v(t) iv(t) i
′
v(t) iv(t) i
′
v(t)
v = 1 0.61 0.60 0.42 0.42 0.57 0.56
2 0.64 0.63 0.39 0.40 0.60 0.58
3 0.56 0.57 0.46 0.45 0.54 0.54
4 0.57 0.57 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.54
5 0.46 0.47 0.54 0.53 0.47 0.48
6 0.60 0.60 0.42 0.42 0.56 0.56
Figure 5: Clayton copulas with (θ, η) = (1, 1.5), (θ, η) = (10, 15), (α, β, γ) = (0.9, 0.9, 0.8).
One may wonder if a more succinct result than Proposition 8 could be obtained by, for example, eliminating
condition (18). Here we use an example to show that if we eliminate condition (18), then Proposition 8 may not
hold. Specifically, consider the network with six nodes illustrated in Figure 5. Suppose C and the Cv’s for v ∈ V are
Clayton copulas with positive parameters θ and η, namely
C(u1, u2) =
[
u−θ1 + u
−θ
2 − 1
]−1/θ
and Cv
(
u1, . . . , udeg(v)
)
=
deg(v)∑
i=1
u−ηi − deg(v) + 1
−1/η .
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Consider two groups of Clayton copulas respectively with parameters (θ, η) = (1, 1.5) and (θ, η) = (10, 15). Denote
the corresponding infection probabilities by iv(t) and i′v(t), respectively. Set (α, β, γ) = (0.9, 0.9, 0.8), and in this
case condition (18) is not satisfied. Set the initial infection probabilities as i(0) = i′(0) = (0.2, 0.1, 0.3, 0.3, 0.6, 0.2).
The table in Figure 5 shows i(t) and i′(t) for t = 6, 7, 8, from which we observe that i(t) ≥ i′(t) does not hold. This
means that we cannot eliminate condition (18) in Proposition 8.
5 Conclusions
We have presented the first systematic investigation of cyber epidemic models with dependences. We have derived
epidemic equilibrium thresholds, bounds for equilibrium infection probabilities, and bounds for non-equilibrium in-
fection probabilities, while accommodating arbitrary dependences between the push-based attacks and the pull-based
attacks as well as the dependences between the push-based attacks. In particular, we showed that assuming away the
due dependences can render the results thereof unnecessarily restrictive or even incorrect.
Our study brings up a range of interesting research problems for further work. First, our characterization study
assumes that the dependence or copula structures are given. It is important to know which dependence structures are
more relevant than the others in practice. Second, it is ideal to obtain closed-form results on the equilibrium infection
probabilities and the non-equilibrium infection probabilities. Third, if we cannot derive closed-form results for the
(non-)equilibrium infection probabilities, it is important to seek bounds for these probabilities and systematically
analyze their tightness.
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